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Abstract—We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with M
helpers, where no eavesdropper channel state information (CSI)
is available at the legitimate entities. The exact secure d.o.f. of
the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers with perfect CSI
at the transmitters was found in [1], [2] to be M
M+1
. One of the
key ingredients of the optimal achievable scheme in [1], [2] is to
align cooperative jamming signals with the information symbols
at the eavesdropper to limit the information leakage rate. This
required perfect eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters. Motivated
by the recent result in [3], we propose a new achievable scheme
in which cooperative jamming signals span the entire space of the
eavesdropper, but are not exactly aligned with the information
symbols. We show that this scheme achieves the same secure
d.o.f. of M
M+1
in [1], [2] but does not require any eavesdropper
CSI; the transmitters blindly cooperative jam the eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner introduced the wiretap channel in which a legiti-
mate transmitter wants to have secure communications with
a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper, and
determined its capacity-equivocation region for the degraded
case [4]. Csiszar and Korner extended this result to the general,
not necessarily degraded, wiretap channel [5]. Leung-Yan-
Cheong and Hellman determined the capacity-equivocation
region of the Gaussian wiretap channel [6]. This line of
research has been subsequently extended to many multi-user
settings. Here, we are particularly interested in models with
multiple independent legitimate transmitters, e.g., interference
channel with confidential messages [7], [8], interference chan-
nel with external eavesdroppers [9], multiple access wiretap
channel [10]–[14], wiretap channel with helpers [15], and
relay-eavesdropper channel with deaf helpers [16].
Since in most multi-user scenarios it is difficult to obtain
the exact secrecy capacity region, recently, there has been a
significant interest in studying the asymptotic performance of
these systems at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in terms of
their secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) regions. Achievable
secure d.o.f. has been studied for several channel structures,
such as the K-user Gaussian interference channel with confi-
dential messages [17], [18], K-user interference channel with
external eavesdroppers [19] in ergodic fading setting [17],
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Fig. 1. The Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers.
[20], Gaussian wiretap channel with helpers [1], [2], [21]–
[23], Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel [24] in er-
godic fading setting [25], multiple antenna compound wiretap
channel [26], and wireless X network [27]. The exact sum
secure d.o.f. was found for a large class of one-hop wireless
networks, including the wiretap channel with M helpers, two-
user interference channel with confidential messages, and K-
user multiple access wiretap channel in [2], and for all two-
unicast layered wireless networks in [28], [29].
In this paper, we revisit the Gaussian wiretap channel with
M helpers, see Fig. 1. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
wiretap channel with no helpers is the difference between the
individual channel capacities of the transmitter-receiver and
the transmitter-eavesdropper pairs. This difference does not
scale with the SNR, and hence the secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian
wiretap channel with no helpers is zero, indicating a severe
penalty due to secrecy. It has been known that the secrecy
rates can be improved if there are helpers which can transmit
independent signals [10], [11], however, if the helpers transmit
i.i.d. Gaussian signals, then the secure d.o.f. is still zero [25].
It has been also known that positive secure d.o.f. could be
achieved if the helpers sent structured signals [21]–[23], but
the exact secure d.o.f. was unknown. References [1], [2] deter-
mined the exact secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel
with M helpers to be M
M+1 . This result was derived under
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the alignment scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers with eavesdropper’s CSI available at all transmitters.
the assumption that the eavesdropper’s CSI was available at
the transmitters. In the present paper, we show that the same
secure d.o.f. can be achieved even when the eavesdropper’s
CSI is unknown at the legitimate transmitters. This result
is practically significant because, generally, it is difficult or
impossible to obtain the eavesdropper’s CSI. Since the upper
bound developed in [1], [2] is valid for this case also, we
thus determine the exact secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with M helpers with no eavesdropper CSI to be M
M+1 .
The achievable scheme in the case of no eavesdropper CSI
here is significantly different than the achievable scheme with
eavesdropper CSI developed in [1], [2].
In particular, in [1], [2], the legitimate transmitter divides
its message into M sub-messages and sends them on M
different irrational dimensions. Each one of the helpers sends
a cooperative jamming signal. The message signals and the
cooperative jamming signals are sent in such a way that: 1)
the cooperative jamming signals are aligned at the legitimate
receiver in the same irrational dimension, so that they oc-
cupy the smallest possible space at the legitimate receiver
to enable the decodability of the message signals, and 2)
each cooperative jamming signal is aligned exactly in the
same irrational dimension with one of the message signals
at the eavesdropper to protect it. This scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 2 for M = 2 helpers. In [1], [2], we used insights
from [21]–[23] to show that, when a cooperative jamming
signal is aligned with a message signal in the same irrational
dimension at the eavesdropper, this alignment protects the
message signal, and limits the information leakage rate to
the eavesdropper by a constant which does not depend on
the transmit power. Meanwhile, due to the alignment of the
cooperative jamming signals in a small space at the legitimate
receiver, the information rate to the legitimate receiver can
be made to scale with the transmit power. We use this real
interference alignment [30], [31] based approach to achieve a
secure d.o.f. of M
M+1 for almost all channel gains, and develop
a converse to show that it is in fact the secure d.o.f. capacity.
The achievable scheme in the present paper again divides
the message into M sub-messages. Each one of the helpers
sends a cooperative jamming signal. As a major difference
from the achievable scheme in [1], [2], in this achievable
scheme, the legitimate transmitter also sends a cooperative
jamming signal. This scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 for
M = 2 helpers. In this case, the message signals and the
cooperative jamming signals are sent in such a way that:
1) all M + 1 cooperative jamming signals are aligned at
the legitimate receiver in the same irrational dimension, and
2) all cooperative jamming signals span the entire space
at the eavesdropper to limit the information leakage to the
eavesdropper. We use insights from [3], which developed a
new achievable scheme that achieved the same secure d.o.f. as
in [26] without eavesdropper CSI, to show that the information
leakage to the eavesdropper is upper bounded by a function,
which can be made arbitrarily small. On the other hand, since
the cooperative jamming signals occupy the smallest space at
the legitimate receiver, the information rate to the legitimate
receiver can be made to scale with the transmit power. In this
achievable scheme, we let the legitimate transmitter and the
helpers blindly cooperative jam the eavesdropper. Because of
the inefficiency of blind cooperative jamming, here, we had to
use more cooperative jamming signals than in [1], [2], i.e., in
[1], [2] we use a total of M cooperative jamming signals from
the helpers, while here we use M + 1 cooperative jamming
signals, one of which coming from the legitimate transmitter.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
The Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers, see Fig. 1,
is defined by
Y1 = h1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
hjXj +N1 (1)
Y2 = g1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
gjXj +N2 (2)
where Y1 is the channel output of the legitimate receiver, Y2
is the channel output of the eavesdropper, X1 is the channel
input of the legitimate transmitter, Xi, for i = 2, . . . ,M + 1,
are the channel inputs of the M helpers, hi is the channel
gain of the ith transmitter to the legitimate receiver, gi is the
channel gain of the ith transmitter to the eavesdropper, and N1
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the alignment scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers with no eavesdropper CSI.
and N2 are two independent zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian
random variables. All channel inputs satisfy average power
constraints, E
[
X2i
]
≤ P , for i = 1, . . . ,M + 1.
Transmitter 1 intends to send a message W , uniformly
chosen from a set W , to the legitimate receiver (receiver
1). The rate of the message is R △= 1
n
log |W|, where n is
the number of channel uses. Transmitter 1 uses a stochastic
function f : W → X1 to encode the message, where
X1
△
= Xn1 is the n-length channel input. We use boldface
letters to denote n-length vector signals, e.g., X1
△
= Xn1 ,
Y1
△
= Y n1 , Y2
△
= Y n2 , etc. The legitimate receiver decodes
the message as Wˆ based on its observation Y1. A secrecy
rate R is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0 there exists an
n-length code such that receiver 1 can decode this message
reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than ǫ,
Pr
[
W 6= Wˆ
]
≤ ǫ (3)
and the message is kept information-theoretically secure
against the eavesdropper,
1
n
H(W |Y2) ≥
1
n
H(W )− ǫ (4)
i.e., that the uncertainty of the message W , given the observa-
tion Y2 of the eavesdropper, is almost equal to the entropy of
the message. The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates is
the secrecy capacity Cs, and the secure d.o.f., Ds, is defined
as
Ds
△
= lim
P→∞
Cs
1
2 logP
(5)
Note that Ds ≤ 1 is an upper bound. To avoid trivial cases,
we assume that h1 6= 0 and g1 6= 0. Without the independent
helpers, i.e., M = 0, and with full knowledge of all channel
gains, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is
known [6]
Cs =
1
2
log
(
1 + h21P
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + g21P
) (6)
and from (5) the secure d.o.f. is zero. Therefore, we assume
M ≥ 1. If there exists a j (j = 2, . . . ,M + 1) such that
hj = 0 and gj 6= 0, then a lower bound of 1 secure d.o.f. can
be obtained for this channel by letting this helper jam the
eavesdropper by i.i.d. Gaussian noise of power P and keeping
all other helpers silent. This lower bound matches the upper
bound, giving the secure d.o.f. On the other hand, if there
exists a j (j = 2, . . . ,M+1) such that hj 6= 0 and gj = 0, then
this helper can be removed from the channel model without
affecting the secure d.o.f. Therefore, in the rest of the paper,
we assume that M ≥ 1 and hj 6= 0 and gj 6= 0 for all
j = 1, · · · ,M + 1.
III. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME WITH NO EAVESDROPPER CSI
In this section, we propose an achievable scheme to achieve
the secure d.o.f. of M
M+1 with no eavesdropper CSI at any
of the transmitters. The only assumption we make is that the
legitimate transmitter knows an upper bound of
∑M+1
k=1 g
2
k ≤ c¯
on the eavesdropper channel gains.
Let {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1, U1, U2, U3, · · · , UM+1} be mutu-
ally independent discrete random variables, each of which
uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q)
C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (7)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to
normalize the transmission power, and is also the minimum
distance between the points belonging to C(a,Q). Exact
values of a and Q will be specified later. We choose the input
signal of the legitimate transmitter as
X1 =
1
h1
U1 +
M+1∑
k=2
αkVk (8)
where {αk}M+1k=2 are rationally independent among themselves
and also rationally independent of all channel gains. The input
signal of the jth helper, j = 2, 3, · · · ,M + 1, is chosen as
Xj =
1
hj
Uj (9)
Note that, neither the legitimate transmitter signal in (8) nor
the helper signals in (9) depend on the eavesdropper CSI
{gk}
M+1
k=1 . With these selections, observations of the receivers
are given by,
Y1 =
M+1∑
k=2
h1αkVk +

M+1∑
j=1
Uj

+N1 (10)
Y2 =
M+1∑
k=2
g1αkVk +
M+1∑
j=1
gj
hj
Uj +N2 (11)
The intuition here is as follows: We use M independent
sub-signals Vk , k = 2, 3, · · · ,M +1, to represent the original
message W . The input signal X1 is a linear combination of
Vks and a jamming signal U1. At the legitimate receiver, all
of the cooperative jamming signals, Uks, are aligned such
that they occupy a small portion of the signal space. Since
{1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1} are rationally independent for
all channel gains, except for a set of Lebesgue measure
zero, the signals
{
V2, V3, · · · , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=1 Uj
}
can be dis-
tinguished by the legitimate receiver. In addition, we ob-
serve that
{
g1
h1
, · · · , gM+1
hM+1
}
are rationally independent, and
therefore, {U1, U2, · · · , UM+1} span the entire space at the
eavesdropper; see Fig. 3. Here, by the entire space, we mean
the maximum number of dimensions that the eavesdropper is
capable of decoding, which is M + 1 in this case. Since the
entire space at the eavesdropper is occupied by the cooperative
jamming signals, the message signals {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1} are
secure, as we will mathematically prove in the sequel.
Since, for j 6= 1, Xj is an i.i.d. sequence and is independent
of X1, the following secrecy rate is achievable [5]
Cs ≥ I(V ;Y1)− I(V ;Y2) (12)
where V △= {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1}.
First, we use Fano’s inequality to bound the first term in
(12). Note that the space observed at receiver 1 consists of
(2Q+1)M (2MQ+2Q+1) points in M +1 dimensions, and
the sub-signal in each dimension is drawn from a constellation
of C(a, (M+1)Q). Here, we use the property that C(a,Q) ⊂
C(a, (M + 1)Q). By using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem
of Diophantine approximation in number theory [30], [31], we
can bound the minimum distance dmin between the points in
receiver 1’s space as follows: For any δ > 0, there exists a
constant kδ such that
dmin ≥
kδa
((M + 1)Q)M+δ
(13)
for almost all rationally independent
{1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1}, except for a set of Lebesgue
measure zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of
decoding error of such a PAM scheme by considering the
additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1,
Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
(14)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8((M + 1)Q)2(M+δ)
)
(15)
where Vˆ is the estimate of V by choosing the closest point
in the constellation based on observation Y1. For any δ > 0,
if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) and a = γP 12 /Q, where γ is a
constant independent of P , then
Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−
k2δγ
2(M + 1)2P
8((M + 1)Q)2(M+δ)+2
)
(16)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2(M + 1)2P δ
8(M + 1)2(M+1+δ)
)
(17)
and we can have Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
→ 0 as P →∞. To satisfy the
power constraint at the transmitters, we can simply choose
γ ≤ min


[
1
|h1|
+
M+1∑
k=2
|αk|
]−1
, |h2|, |h3|, · · · , |hM+1|


(18)
By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V → Y1 → Vˆ ,
we know that
H(V |Y1)
≤ H(V |Vˆ ) (19)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−
k2δγ
2(M + 1)2P δ
8(M + 1)2(M+1+δ)
)
log(2Q+ 1)M (20)
= o(logP ) (21)
where δ and γ are fixed, and o(·) is the little-o function. This
means that
I(V ;Y1) = H(V )−H(V |Y1) (22)
≥ H(V )− o(logP ) (23)
= log(2Q+ 1)M − o(logP ) (24)
≥ logP
M(1−δ)
2(M+1+δ) − o(logP ) (25)
=
M(1− δ)
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− o(logP ) (26)
Next, we need to bound the second term in (12),
I(V ;Y2) = I(V, U ;Y2)− I(U ;Y2|V ) (27)
= I(V, U ;Y2)−H(U |V ) +H(U |Y2, V ) (28)
= I(V, U ;Y2)−H(U) +H(U |Y2, V ) (29)
= h(Y2)− h(Y2|V, U)
−H(U) +H(U |Y2, V ) (30)
= h(Y2)− h(N2)−H(U) +H(U |Y2, V ) (31)
≤ h(Y2)− h(N2)−H(U) + o(logP ) (32)
≤
1
2
log 2πe(1 + c¯P )−
1
2
log 2πe
− log(2Q+ 1)M+1 + o(logP ) (33)
≤
1
2
logP −
(M + 1)(1− δ)
2(M + 1 + δ)
logP + o(logP )
(34)
=
(M + 2)δ
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (35)
where U △= {U1, U2, · · · , UM+1} and c¯ is the upper bound on∑M+1
k=1 g
2
k defined at the beginning of this section, and (32)
is due to the fact that given V and Y2, the eavesdropper can
decode U with probability of error approaching zero since{
g1
h1
, · · · , gM+1
hM+1
}
are rationally independent for all channel
gains, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Then, by
Fano’s inequality, H(U |Y2, V ) ≤ o(logP ) similar to the step
in (21).
Combining (26) and (35), we have
Cs ≥ I(V ;Y1)− I(V ;Y2) (36)
≥
M(1− δ)
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
−
(M + 2)δ
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− o(logP ) (37)
=
M − (2M + 2)δ
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− o(logP ) (38)
where again o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbi-
trarily small, then we can achieve M
M+1 secure d.o.f. for this
model where there is no eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers
without any eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters. We proposed
an achievable scheme that achieves a secure d.o.f. of M
M+1 ,
which is the same as the secure d.o.f. reported in [1], [2]
when the transmitters had perfect eavesdropper CSI. The new
achievability scheme is based on real interference alignment
and blind cooperative jamming. While [1], [2] aligned co-
operative jamming signals with the information symbols at
the eavesdropper to protect the information symbols, which
required eavesdropper CSI, here we used one more cooperative
jamming signal to span the entire space at the eavesdropper
to protect the information symbols. As in [1], [2], here also,
we aligned all of the cooperative jamming signals in the
same dimension at the legitimate receiver, in order to occupy
the smallest space at the legitimate receiver to allow for
the decodability of the information symbols. Therefore, we
aligned the cooperative jamming signals carefully only at
the legitimate receiver, which required only the legitimate
receiver’s CSI at the transmitters.
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